Durkheim’s Greatest Blunder by Marson, Stephen M & Lillis, J. Porter
The Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare 
Volume 46 
Issue 2 June Article 6 
2019 
Durkheim’s Greatest Blunder 
Stephen M. Marson 
University of North Carolina at Pembroke, Professor Emeritus, smarson@nc.rr.com 
J. Porter Lillis 
University of North Carolina at Pembroke, john.lillis@uncp.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/jssw 
Recommended Citation 
Marson, Stephen M. and Lillis, J. Porter (2019) "Durkheim’s Greatest Blunder," The Journal of Sociology & 
Social Welfare: Vol. 46 : Iss. 2 , Article 6. 
Available at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/jssw/vol46/iss2/6 
This Article is brought to you by the Western Michigan 
University School of Social Work. For more information, 
please contact wmu-scholarworks@wmich.edu. 
Durkheim’s Greatest Blunder 
Cover Page Footnote 
Durkheim’s Greatest Blunder 1, 2 1An earlier version of the paper was Presented at the Eastern 
Sociological Society, February 22, 2018 (Baltimore, MD). 2 Special thanks for copy editing must be offered 
to Kathleen Hoffman of Culpeper, VA. 
This article is available in The Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/jssw/vol46/
iss2/6 





University of North Carolina at Pembroke
In describing fatalism in Suicide, Durkheim executes two blunders. 
The	first	can	be	categorized	in	errors of commission while the second 
should be included in errors of omission. In the error of commission 
area, he hypothesizes two platforms for existence of fatalistic suicide. 
Without employing theory-embedded data, he contends that infertility 
is a catalyst for fatalistic suicide. Later, he asserts that slavery is fertile 
soil for fatalistic suicide. Although there is suicidal data in these two 
arenas, a closer inspection demonstrates that these are not character-
istics of fatalistic suicide. For errors of omission, he failed to systemat-
ically observe two social factors for which data was available during 
his time of study. Poverty and poor health existed in a social environ-
ment which is best described by Durkheim’s vision of fatalistic suicide. 
He missed observing and collecting the available data to lend support 
for the empirical existence of fatalistic suicide. These four social factors 
are discussed. 
Key Terms:  Suicide, Durkheim, Fatalism, Poverty, Health, Slavery 
Introduction
 Although all sociological scholars will not agree, most so-
ciologists envision Durkheim’s work on suicide (Durkheim, 
1897) to be an elegant masterpiece of sociological research that 
has held true for over 100 years (Abrutyn & Mueller, 2014; Baller, 
Levchak, & Schultz, 2010; Classen & Dunn, 2010; Helmut, 2010; 
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Maimon, Browning, & Brooks-Gunn, 2010). However, with the 
sharp criticism leveled against Durkheim by Nolan, Triplett, 
and McDonough (2010) and Besnard (1973), the question must be 
asked “Does Durkheim’s Suicide have applications in the world 
of a practitioner who must address suicide on a daily basis?” 
Davenport and Davenport (1987), Marson and Powell (2012) and 
Marson (2019) demonstrate Durkheim’s work to be an effective 
tool for practitioners. Thus, in practical terms, Durkheim’s work 
remains relevant [a brief summary of Durkheim’s theory can be 
found in Appendix A].
 Durkheim (1897) believed the weakest aspect of his theory was 
the fatalism continuum that theoretically exists opposite to ano-
mie. He was so unsure about the fatalism continuum that he limit-
ed his discussion of fatalism to a single paragraph on page 276:
The above considerations show that there is a type of suicide 
the opposite of anomic suicide, just as egoistic and altruistic 
suicides are opposites. It is the suicide deriving from exces-
sive regulation, that of persons with future pitilessly blocked 
and passions violently choked by oppressive discipline. It is 
the suicide of very young husbands, of the married woman 
who is childless. So, for completeness’s sake, we should set 
up a fourth suicidal type. But it has so little contemporary 
importance and examples are so hard to find aside from the 
cases just mentioned that it seems useless to dwell upon it. 
However it might be said to have historical interest. So note 
the suicides of slaves, said to be frequent under certain con-
ditions (See Corre, Le crime en pays creoles, p. 48), belong to this 
type, or all suicides attributable to excessive physical or moral 
despotism? To bring out the ineluctible [sic] and inflexible na-
ture of a rule against which has just been used, we might call 
it fatalistic suicide.
Based on the tone of his writing, Durkheim was not sure of the 
existence of fatalism. He suggests that fatalism is theoretical 
and is not likely to be found in social reality. Although he did 
not see fatalism within his data collection, this type of suicide 
did exist within his historical timeframe.
 Durkheim’s experience with fatalism was like Einstein’s 
work on the cosmological constant. Although Einstein may not 
have referred to his work in this area as the “biggest blunder” 
in his life (Livio, 2013), it is clear that he believed that Λ (the 
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cosmological constant) could not be integrated within his theory 
of general relativity. During the 1990’s, physicists demonstrated 
that Einstein’s cosmological constant is an accurate portrayal of 
the scientific reality. Thus, Einstein was wrong in believing he 
was wrong. Like Einstein, Durkheim was wrong in discounting 
the significance of fatalism in society. More specifically, with-
in Einstein’s analysis, he committed errors of commission and 
omission.  Durkheim did the same.
Errors of Commission
 In his errors of commission, Durkheim, without the use 
of accompanying data, hypothesized social factors that sup-
ported the existence of fatalistic suicide. The two social factors 
he proposed are associated with suicide but failed to capture 
the essence of fatalistic suicide. Even if we strictly adhere to 
Durkheim’s own definition of fatalism, his examples do not fit.
Infertility as an Example for Fatalistic Suicide 
 In his first example, Durkheim hypothesizes that infertili-
ty could spin a husband and/or wife into the arena of fatalistic 
suicide. Even taking into consideration the norms of his time, 
Nolan, Triplett, and McDonough (2010) and Besnard (1973) char-
acterize Durkheim as chauvinistic. Based on his sentence struc-
ture, he emphasized the husband first. If it was not for the com-
ma, his writing structure would suggest he completely ignored 
the emotional trauma when wives are confronted with infer-
tility. Most importantly, Durkheim assumed that infertility is 
the wife’s responsibility. Clearly, he did not consider that a hus-
band can be incapable of fathering children. Although Lukes 
(1985) envisions Durkheim as an emotionally sensitive person, 
Durkheim misunderstood the social parameters of marriage 
during his period of history. 
 Further insight is provided by Finn (2009) when he demon-
strates that starting in 1870–71 and culminating in the decade 
of the 1890s (just before the publication of Suicide), France 
was suffering from a critically low birth rate. There were not 
enough newborns to replace those who died. During this same 
timeframe, there was a women’s movement. “Marie Huot, the 
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feminist who coined the phrase ‘la grève des ventres’ [wombs 
on strike] was a member of the group fighting for female auton-
omy and access to birth control” (p. 31). Thus, Durkheim’s com-
mentary on the emotional trauma of husbands was a reflection 
of the women’s rights movement during his writing of Suicide. 
In the historical circumstances, Durkheim’s emphasis on men is 
more understandable. 
 Nevertheless, and uncharacteristically, Durkheim failed to 
employ any suicide data regarding suicide and infertility. Us-
ing today’s research, we find that when men face infertility, 
they manifest measurable levels of depression, but no suicide 
ideation that has been uncovered (Chachamovich et al., 2010). 
Among infertile wives, Fatoye, Owolabi, Eegunranti and Fatoye 
(2008) found depression. The depression was found to be mea-
surably worse for wives than their husbands, even those who 
share a deep desire for children. In addition, and more impor-
tantly for the study of Durkheim’s theory, contemporary data 
demonstrate that there exists an association between suicide 
rates and infertility for wives but not husbands (Kjaer et al., 
2011; Shani, Yelena, Reut, Adrian, & Sami, 2016; Venn, Hem-
minki, Watson, Bruinsma, & Healy, 2001). However, in closely 
reading the literature on the association between suicide and 
infertility, it becomes apparent we are not seeing the intense 
level of regulation found within the definition of fatalism. This 
terminal act in reaction to infertility in this situation cannot be 
categorized as fatalistic suicide.
 In the case of infertility, husband and wife have an array of 
options and hopes. In addition, they are not saturated in regula-
tion—chief characteristics of fatalism. There is always a chance 
to get pregnant and there are a variety of available options to 
have children. Also, there are other life activities that instill so-
cial stimulation. Although written in the late 1800’s, Durkheim’s 
hypothesis regarding infertility was farfetched, even during his 
lifetime. It is likely that Durkheim knew some particular man 
that he took as an example, a man whose emotional distress 
about his wife’s infertility approximated “fatalism.” He was not 
systematic in constructing his hypothesis. If he looked at the 
data, he would have realized that such suicide fell into the cate-
gory of altruism, not fatalism. In a literature review (including: 
Chachamovich et al., 2010; Fatoye et al., 2008; Kjaer et al., 2011; 
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Shani et al., 2016; Venn et al., 2001), it is abundantly apparent 
that the depression, suicide and suicidal ideation are associat-
ed with the pressure to have children from within the family/
group. This is not fatalism, but it is altruistic suicide.
Slavery as an Example of Fatalistic Suicide
 Later in the same footnote, Durkheim (1897) offers another 
example by hypothesizing that the condition of slavery is the 
ideal fatalistic social environment. Durkheim notes that slaves 
are confronted with “excessive physical or moral despotism…
the ineluctible [sic—ineluctable] and inflexible nature of a rule 
against which there is no appeal” (p. 276). Unlike the details and 
thoroughness Durkheim employs with the other three types 
of suicide, for fatalism he fails to include data or other sub-
stantive observations. He includes only one citation in which 
Corre (1889) lent theoretical support for fatalistic suicide among 
French slaves [the original French text is found in Appendix B]: 
All the doctors who have studied the diseases of the Negroes, 
the administrators, or the colonists, who have treated the 
behavior of the great plantations and the direction to their 
unfortunate human flocks, agree to declare an extraordinary 
frequency of suicide among the slaves. The unfortunate black 
man, at the memory of the lost country and family, under the 
accumulation of miseries and sufferings, turns against him; 
in the conflicts he sometimes has with his own kind, he does 
not even stoop to react by vengeance; He ends his quarrels, 
often the most futile, by his own suppression. (p. 48)
Perhaps Durkheim’s reference to Corre was an afterthought 
based on pressure from the publisher to include a reference 
in this footnote. Corre does not appear to be an influence on 
Durkheim’s intellect, since none of Durkheim’s biographies ac-
knowledge Corre (Fournier, 2013; Giddens, 1978; LaCapra, 1972; 
Lukes, 1985). 
 Based on this single citation, one can easily understand 
how Durkheim would have considered suicide among western 
hemisphere slaves as fatalistic. If Durkheim had closely read 
page 13 of Corre (1889), he would have identified slave suicide as 
anomic. Later on pages 48 to 51, Corre alludes to characteristics 
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of ancestral-related suicide that are more characteristic of what 
Durkheim called altruistic suicide. On the same pages, Corre 
suggests an anatomic predisposition to suicide among slaves. 
The bottom line is that Corre’s book does not provide adequate 
information that slavery is the ideal platform for fatalistic sui-
cide. It is also clear that Durkheim does not devote the same lev-
el of academic rigor to addressing fatalism as he did to anomic, 
egotistic and altruistic suicide. A couple of sentences in a book 
cannot support a theory. Without using raw data or statisti-
cal analysis, Pearce (1987) supports the position that fatalistic 
suicide is the slave’s fate. For the other three types of suicide, 
Durkheim employs suicide notes and public records as his da-
tabase. Can Durkheim’s hypothesis addressing the linkage be-
tween slaves and fatalistic suicide be tested? 
 The problem with Durkheim’s vision of slavery is lack 
of depth. Unlike his description of other social institutions, 
Durkheim envisioned slavery one-dimensionally and failed to 
see the variability in the distribution of slaves and the distri-
bution of slave owners. Our basic understanding of the laws 
of probability provides a solid backdrop from which to under-
stand suicide among slaves. The slave population numbered in 
the millions and included a variety of very different cultural 
values and spiritualties, as noted by Corre’s (1889) first-hand ob-
servations. With such a wide distribution of variables, it would 
be nearly impossible to fail to identify all four of Durkheim’s 
suicides within the slave population. Durkheim’s position here 
can best be described as ethnocentric. 
 Of course, Durkheim did not have access to current histor-
ical research, or to documents addressing slavery in the “new 
world.” For example, recent historical research clearly demon-
strates that the largest proportion of slave suicides must be con-
sidered anomic. There were many accounts of suicides among 
slaves that were sensationalized in newspapers (Bell, 2012; Bu-
chanan, 2001; Synder, 2010) but public records were rare, and 
slaves did not leave suicide notes. Private data by plantation 
masters were kept but not available for public perusal during 
Durkheim’s time. An example of information of the kind 
Durkheim could not access is the work of Snyder (2010), who 
reports that:
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Some ship captains kept account of their cargo losses for in-
vestors and insurers; one study of surgeons’ logs for the pe-
riod 1792-– reveals that 7.2 percent of captive Africans killed 
themselves at some point during capture, embarkation, or 
along the middle passage. Particularly at loading points on 
the African coast and aboard ships during the middle pas-
sage, captive Africans’ self-destruction was common enough 
to warrant the use of the earliest technologies for suicide pre-
vention. (p. 40)
There is no doubt that logs kept by ship captains and surgeons 
are describing suicide, but this type of suicide does not fit with-
in the fatalistic. It fits within the anomic framework. Another 
problem is that evidence demonstrates that slave masters would 
make a homicide appear as a suicide for a coroner’s inquest. 
There was an economic incentive for a slave to have been said 
to have committed suicide rather than being murdered by the 
master. Thus, even if Durkheim had access to private records, 
the reliability of the data would be questionable. 
  One surprising and critical error made by Durkheim is his 
lack of analysis of cultures from which slaves were captured. 
Although Durkheim is held in high esteem for his analysis of 
small non-European cultures, he did not apply his knowledge 
within his discussion of suicide among slaves. Durkheim would 
have agreed that the cultural groups from which the slaves were 
captured and later sold would have had a profound impact on 
suicidal propensity. Yet Durkheim did not apply his knowledge 
of cultural variations to slave populations. The most compre-
hensive analysis of slave suicide in the framework of culture is 
the work of Snyder (2015). She does not support the notion that 
fatalistic suicide dominated the social structure of slavery.
 The piece of slavery data that Durkheim needed is in the 
work of Lee and Lee (1977). They completed a study that com-
pared health patterns between whites and slaves in Savannah 
between 1860 and 1870, including an analysis of suicide data. 
They state “Thus, despite the conditions of slavery and the dis-
organization of reconstruction, blacks did not view suicide as a 
solution to their problems” (p. 176). Within this data set, there 
were no differences between white and slave suicide rates.
 To make the analysis of slavery and suicide more con-
founding, there is evidence suggesting a great variability in the 
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treatment of slaves. For example, Chernow (2010) produces ev-
idence that George Washington’s slaves had access to guns for 
hunting. Washington thought that it was cost-effective for slaves 
to hunt for their own meat. Crapol (2006) documents testimony 
from slaves acknowledging that President John Tyler was a kind 
man, while other slaves suggested that he was ruthless. Like non-
slave cultures, within slave cultures there is a great amount of 
variability that prohibits the ability to suggest a single suicidal 
platform. In the simplest terms, historical and statistical evidence 
clearly demonstrates that we can find all four of Durkheim’s sui-
cides within the social structure of slavery.
Errors of Omission
 In errors of omission, Durkheim failed to systematically 
observe the world around him. Specifically, he failed to inte-
grate what seem to be two obvious platforms for fatalistic sui-
cide: poverty and the decline of health. Were these two factors 
truly obvious during Durkheim’s time or is the contemporary 
acknowledgment of his failure a matter of benefiting from 100 
years of sociological research? Considering the data he had 
available in combination with the French social atmosphere 
during his time, the failure to include poverty was a grossly 
unmindful error for the social analysis of fatalistic suicide.
 Less obviously, he failed to consider health decline as a plat-
form for fatalistic suicide. There is little evidence that Durkheim 
studied social factors related to health considerations. Within 
Durkheim’s historical timeframe, the chronic illnesses and 
physical disabilities did not dominate the social landscape as 
it does today. For example, during Durkheim’s time, if a per-
son fell off a horse and broke his back, he would die before he 
had an opportunity to consider suicide. Today, if a man breaks 
his back, it is common for him to live for decades contemplat-
ing suicide without the physical capacity to act. Chronic illness 
commonly associated with aging simply was not a dominant 
social fact during Durkheim’s time. Within our contemporary 
social environments, chronic incurable illness and permanent 
physical disability are fertile soil for fatalistic suicide. However, 
during Durkheim’s time the low frequency of occurrences of 
lingering illness rendered health decline nearly unobservable. 
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 The prime characteristic of both poverty and health prob-
lems is a social lock-down. Both are embedded with limited so-
cial interaction, social migration and social mobility—all char-
acteristics of fatalistic suicide. Poverty and ill health are missing 
links within Durkheim’s analysis of the fatalistic. The critical 
features of these two social factors are addressed within our 
understanding of Durkheim’s thinking process.
Poverty
 The study of poverty was a weak part of Durkheim’s ac-
ademic endeavors until he began his work on The Elementary 
Forms of the Religious Life in the early 1900’s (Young, 1994). This, 
of course, was 15 years after Suicide was published. Simply stat-
ed, Durkheim missed the linkage between poverty and fatalis-
tic suicide. However, Durkheim’s insights into poverty are quite 
perplexing based on the social influences in his life.
 For over 200 years, the French Revolution has had a pro-
found impact on the collective consciousness of the French 
people (Kaplan, 1995). Durkheim (1915) wrote that the French 
Revolution was the catalyst for the birth of sociology. He ac-
knowledged that the consequences of the French Revolution 
included the reorganization of the French government and cul-
ture. This supreme struggle was a 70-year process that eventu-
ally unfolded into what has been labelled the “Third Republic.” 
The preoccupation of nurturing this stable but fragile Third 
Republic opened the door to Durkheim’s first academic ap-
pointment in the social sciences (Coser, 1977). The mainstream 
French intelligentsia embraced the notion that survival of both 
culture and government depended on the scientific study of 
society—which, of course, was Durkheim’s predominate vision 
within his published works and philosophical lectures. Thus, 
we can consider that Durkheim’s thoughts were emerging into 
mainstream French thought and were a tool to address the so-
cial scars inflicted by the French Revolution. 
 Most importantly, the emergence of Durkheim’s social theo-
rizing was influenced by the social forces that were the catalyst 
for the revolution. In fact, most of his theoretical contributions 
were generated from his reflection on the revolution—particu-
larly The Division of Labor in Society (LaCapra, 1972). From the 
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consequences of the French Revolution emerged Durkheim’s 
emphasis that the structural component within a society has 
a specific function in maintaining a social equilibrium (Lukes, 
1985). Most importantly, societies do not naturally move toward 
a state of homeostasis, but he believed that sociologically in-
spired actions would return society to normal following events 
like the revolution. His “scientific” perspective was a source of 
the hope that the French people desperately needed to dig their 
way out of the damage of the revolution. 
 Although there were several causal factors that led to the 
French Revolution, one undisputed factor was poverty (Green, 
2015; Jones, 1989; Luaute, 2016). Prior to the revolution, poverty 
grew because of feeble economic decision-making by the French 
monarchy. Poverty within the masses caused a sense of great 
social lockdown. Amid this period of intense social regula-
tion, the suicide rates were high before the revolution (Merrick, 
2006). By using Durkheim’s own definition of fatalism, the his-
torical period prior to the revolution could easily be described 
as fatalistic. But when blood ran through the streets of Paris and 
violence became commonplace in France, the lockdown social 
regulations dissipated, and the suicide rates dropped (Merrick, 
2006). This is fatalistic suicide! Since the French Revolution was 
the catalyst for his entrance to a professorship in social science 
and his central theoretical concepts emerged from his reflection 
of the revolution, how could he miss the suicide data available 
to him? There is no answer to this question except that he might 
have been too close to see it.
 Durkheim missed the opportunity to collect critical relevant 
public data during the time he was writing Suicide.  According 
to Luaute (2016), in the late 1800’s Paris witnessed a spike in sui-
cides. Most alarming was what was labeled as family suicides. 
Because of the social lockdown associated with poverty, parents 
and their children committed suicide together. Some decades 
prior to Durkheim’s work, French public authorities developed 
the concept “poverty/reversal of fortune” as the cause of many 
suicides. According to Luauate (2016), this type of suicide was 
widespread during Durkheim’s time. It is quite astounding 
that he failed to include this blatant social problem within his 
analysis. Poverty provides a much sounder illustration of fatal-
istic suicide than either infertility or slavery. In addition, it is 
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surprising that Durkheim failed to see that prior to the revolu-
tion in France, the environment fit perfectly into his definition 
of fatalism. Lastly, it is also surprising that many sociologists 
who have studied Durkheim failed to connect the data on fatal-
istic suicide with poverty. 
 Durkheim (1897) does state that fatalistic suicide exists in 
a social environment that is smothered with “excessive regu-
lation, that of persons with futures pitilessly blocked and pas-
sions violently choked by oppressive discipline” (p. 276). From 
the social structure perspective that Durkheim would have 
used, over social regulation and entrapment are embedded in 
poverty. Socioeconomic factors impede a person’s ability to ac-
quire basic needs for subsistence. Clearly, Durkheim’s explana-
tion of fatalistic suicide is a contemporary description of the so-
cial structure of poverty. When escape from poverty is unlikely, 
the social environment becomes fertile for fatalistic suicide. 
However, when escape from poverty is a reasonable possibility, 
fatalism will not exist. An environment embedded with access 
to social options kills fatalism.
 Although they use Durkheim’s work on suicide as a concep-
tual framework, Recker and Moore (2016) fail to make the con-
nection between fatalistic suicide and poverty. However, Steeg, 
Haigh, Webb, Kapur, Awenat, Gooding, Pratt, and Cooper (2016) 
stress that their data demonstrates poverty as being saturat-
ed with stagnation. Data reported by Haw, Hawton and Casey 
(2006) shows suicide among the homeless is commonplace. Ey-
nan, Langley, Tolomiczenko, Rhodes, Links, Wasylenki and Go-
ering (2002) report that suicide attempts for the homeless range 
between 20% to 48%. These rates are 10% greater than the general 
population (Patterson & Holden, 2012). This excessively high sui-
cide rate among those who are homeless is an international prob-
lem that also exists in socialist countries (Noël et al., 2016). Partis 
(2003) represents data that is congruent to Durkheim’s vision of 
fatalistic suicide when he reports that among many homeless, 
suicide is envisioned as the only alternative to eliminate a sense 
of social stagnation with no hope for change. 
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Health
 The historical period in which Durkheim completed all of 
his work is Third Republic (1870 to 1940). Although the French 
Revolution ended in 1799, its impact on French government and 
society was profoundly far-reaching. Its effects were like a su-
pernova, and its shock waves reached to 1870—the beginning 
of the Third Republic. The revolution fragmented or destroyed 
social structures. Auguste Comte’s observations of its aftermath 
led to his The Positive Philosophy, originally published in 1855. 
His major tenet that social structures are real things that the sci-
entific method should be employed to understand was not taken 
seriously until Durkheim’s pronouncement that sociology should 
be an academic discipline. The atmosphere of the Third Republic 
envisioned that stabilization of French culture and government 
would be found in the scientific study of society. 
 During the Third Republic, France could best be described 
as adapting, changing and evolving with the emergence of so-
cial or political regulation. The nation could not be described 
as strictly regulated nor stagnated—which creates the soil from 
which fatalism emerges. The overall characteristics of French 
society help explain the reasoning behind Durkheim’s failure 
to provide an in-depth analysis of fatalism. The social soil from 
which fatalism could emerge did not exist in the Third Repub-
lic. Even after 70 years of social healing, French officials and the 
intelligentsia were preoccupied with macro strategies to secure 
stability. None of the overarching sociological characteristics of 
the Third Republic could propel fatalism.
 Like all other social institutions within the Third Repub-
lic, the health care structure was subjected to the residue of the 
French Revolution’s shock waves. Using data from the Third 
Republic, Meserve (2017) completed an analysis of the health 
care structure. He concluded that politics and disorganization 
produced an unbalanced health care delivery structure. The 
problem with health care was not only with funding but rather 
the lack of an institutional memory and political incentives that 
motivated effective delivery of health care services. Health care 
technology and staff were available, but some French citizens 
were not getting the needed medical intervention. 
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 During the Third Republic, medical quacks were running 
rampant (Johnson, 2012). From this emerged an overall mistrust 
by the French citizenry toward medical professionals. As a re-
sult, in an effort to be distinguished from quacks, physicians 
developed reluctance to accepting payment of their services. In 
addition, to combat quacks and bolster the emergence of med-
ical professionalism, the French government learned that the 
central decision-maker within households is the mother. As a 
result, efforts were directed toward persuading women to en-
trust their family’s health to a physician, and they were success-
ful. This strategy produced the professionalization of medicine 
in the Third Republic (Lacy, 2008). Nevertheless, Weiss (1983) 
observed that great inequalities of health care existed with the 
exception of emergency cases. He also contended that a notice-
able stability in health care delivery was unfolding between 
1871 and 1914. 
 Unlike the connection with poverty, Durkheim must be 
forgiven for missing the linkage of fatalism and health. First, 
comparatively speaking, the data on health/suicide was very 
limited during Durkheim’s time. Second, during that time, the 
average life expectancy was in the mid to late 40’s [see: https://
www.ined.fr/en/everything_about_population/graphs-maps/
interpreted-graphs/life-expectancy-france/]. People simply did 
not live long enough to confront the chronic health conditions 
that can make life miserable. Medical intervention was not able 
to keep a person alive long enough for the pain to be unbearable. 
Unlike in the case of poverty, the data simply was not available 
to Durkheim, although it is available today.
 By today’s standards, the most obvious of all fatalistic envi-
ronments is declining health. There is an unambiguous causal 
feature between declining physical health and suicide (Fiske & 
O’Riley, 2016; Fiske, O’Riley, & Widow, 2008; Preville, Hebert, 
Boyer, Bravo, & Seguin, 2005; Sinyor, Tan, Schaffer, Gallagher, 
Shulman, 2016; Wiktorsson et al., 2016). Older people pursue 
suicide when faced with chronic, progressive and irreversible 
poor health or pain (Meeks et al., 2008). Cressey (2007) points 
out that the diagnosis of cancer increases the risk of suicide 
by 50%.  When faced with extreme pain, patients significantly 
increased their suicidal ideation and suicide attempts (Hyun, 
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2016). Intense regulation is the watchword in a fatalistic so-
cial environment and the data unambiguously links it to poor 
health and irreconcilable pain.
Summary
 There is no doubt that Durkheim’s work within Suicide had 
a profound impact on the development and credibility of so-
ciology as a social science. Certainly, his work is flawed, but the 
question is how flawed? He provided an in-depth analysis, de-
scription and evidence for three continua—anomistic, altruistic, 
and egotistic suicide. Our understanding of fatalistic suicide 
emerges primarily because it exists on the opposite end of the 
anomistic continuum.  
 Figure 1 best conceptualizes and summarizes the problem-
atic nature of Durkheim’s explanation of fatalistic suicide.
In terms of errors of commission (Figure 1, cell b), fertility and 
slavery are far from good examples of fatalistic suicide. Through-
out Suicide, Durkheim stresses the centrality of the social envi-
ronment as the catalyst for suicide. His brief commentary on 
fertility sounds more like an explanation from a psychologist. It 
is an exercise in reductionism. To a slight degree, his example of 
slavery is less reductionistic, but still problematic. 
 For slavery, Durkheim lacked a depth of analysis (when 
compared to other concepts in his book). In addition to his in-
ability to conceptualize slavery as a social institution, he failed 
to assess it thoroughly and scientifically. First, he failed to thor-
oughly read Corre (1889). If Durkheim considered Corre’s book 
in its entirety, he would have realized that the slave population 
was subjected to all four types of suicide. The suicide of slaves 
theoretically approximated the suicide patterns of white Euro-
peans. Second, he failed to consider that the slave population 
Figure 1.  Analysis by Error
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was normally distributed. Two years prior to Suicide, he pub-
lished The Rules of the Sociological Method, where he addressed 
the functions of a normal distribution with his commentary 
of the community of angels. In his example of suicide among 
slaves, he violated the scientific rules he had established two 
years earlier.
 In terms of errors of omission (see Figure 1, cell a), the fact 
that he did not address poverty is particularly perplexing. Histo-
rians commonly state that poverty is one of the major causes for 
the French Revolution (Green, 2015; Jones, 1989). As it did with 
most French intellectuals, the revolution plagued Durkheim’s 
mind. More than likely Durkheim suffered from cognitive dis-
sonance. There was pride in the ability of commoners to have 
overthrown a seemingly hedonistic government, but embar-
rassment resulted from the irrational violence that followed. It 
is quite incredible that Durkheim did not consider poverty as a 
variable for sociological analysis until late in his life. 
 His omission of addressing health (see Figure 1, cell c) is both 
reasonable and forgivable. With the average life expectancy at 
40, serious illness or a catastrophic accident was a death warrant. 
Contemplation of suicide because of declining health was virtu-
ally nonexistent during the late 1800’s. There are no references to 
health in Suicide. Even if such suicides were included, they would 
be so infrequent that they would not register in the minds of 18th 
century sociologists. Durkheim’s omission of health in his expla-
nation of fatalistic suicide is therefore forgivable.
 When considering all the research and theorizing that 
Durkheim had to manage in writing Suicide, it becomes clear 
that he accomplished a Herculean task. In considering his ap-
proach compared to the way a sociologist would write Suicide 
today, the conclusion is, “how could Durkheim write this book 
without a computer?” Without the use of a computer, he would 
have to spend an exhausting amount of time checking refer-
ences, assessing verb tense agreement, verifying and compiling 
data, etc. The complexities and the difficulties of writing during 
Durkheim’s historical time period could easily have been so 
distracting that he failed to seize the opportunity to include fa-
talism. His blunder is forgivable. 
 The missing historical and empirical evidence in the are-
na of fatalistic suicide does little to discredit the important 
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contribution made by Durkheim. The important point is that 
his theoretical framework is robust enough to enable other re-
searchers to use his contribution to the research. Although he 
failed to recognize the existence of fatalism during his time, his 
theory has adequate explanatory power to be applicable during 
other eras. In addition, practitioners are employing Durkheim’s 
contribution as part of intervention strategies (Davenport & 
Davenport, 1987; Marson & Powell, 2012). Thus, Durkheim’s the-
ory of suicide remains sound.
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This typology has been covered extensively in every theory 
textbook addressing classical sociology theory, but we provide 
a condensed explanation of the model.
 Social regulation provides for the norms and values of a 
society that enable persons to get their needs fulfilled. Under-
standing the acceptable forms of behavior combined with the 
ability and opportunity to interact with others to meet needs is 
inherent to an individual’s survival in a social world. 
Appendix A
A Summary of Durkheim’s Suicide
 Durkheim’s typologies of suicides provide a profound insight 
into the continua of two types of regulation on human behavior, 
social regulation and moral regulation. At the extreme of either 
continua, Durkheim theorizes that suicide risk is greatest; a re-
sult of either insufficient or excessive integration. These ideas are 
captured graphically by Figure 2 (Marson & Powell, 2011). 
Figure 2. Durkheim’s Suicide Model
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 Reading Figure 2, from left to right, starting at the left, if 
an individual is insufficiently integrated into society, that is, 
if an individual has “excessive individualism,” that individ-
ual will not be held under social control. Such an individual 
has a heightened risk for egoistic suicide. This view of society, 
a great example of structural functionalism, sees individual’s 
wants and needs subordinate to society’s needs. A sufficient-
ly integrated individual would not contemplate suicide, as the 
collectivity needs all persons to contribute and play their par-
ticular parts. An insufficiently integrated individual who only 
sees oneself as defining one’s roles and duties lacks the societal 
norms and goals that would necessitate continuing to live. The 
ties that bind are the ties that protect against egoistic suicide. 
Unmarried persons, religiously unaffiliated or marginally affil-
iated are examples of this type of suicide. 
 On the right side of Figure 2, we see the dangers inherent 
if an individual is too integrated into society, where the needs 
of the individual are lost or sacrificed to the needs of the many. 
“Insufficient individuation” may lead to altruistic suicide. This 
type of suicide for Durkheim was an act that results from an 
excessive sense of duty. Soldiers giving their lives for others ex-
emplifies this type of suicide.
 Moral regulation, reading from top down of Figure 2 can 
also be a source of suicide if there is excessive or insufficient 
integration. Fatalistic suicide, the form that Durkheim devoted 
the least to (the purpose of this paper is to explain why and 
expand on the theory) is a result of excessive moral regulation. 
With “excessive regulation,” and “a future pitilessly blocked,” 
an individual may feel that there is no way out, but to take one’s 
own life. Durkheim’s examples were crude and insufficient, 
again the point of this paper. Better examples of this type of 
suicide have been offered here, poverty and failing health. 
 Anomic suicide occurs when an individual has not enough 
moral regulation. Anomie is most often defined as a state of norm-
lessness, better understood as a state where the norms no longer 
apply and an individual is no longer limited in their passions or 
cannot get their needs met.
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Appendix B
Page 48 of: Corre, A. (1889). Le Crim en Pays Creoles: Esquisse d'Eth-
nographie Criminelle [Crime in Creole Countries: Sketch of Criminal 
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